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The paper broadens the focus of empirical research on salesforce management to include multitasking
settings with multidimensional incentives, where salespeople have private information about customers.
This allows us to ask novel substantive questions around multidimensional incentive design and job design
while managing the costs and benefits of private information. To this end, the paper introduces the first
structural model of a multitasking salesforce in response to multidimensional incentives. The model also
accommodates (i) dynamic intertemporal tradeoffs in effort choice across the tasks and (ii) salesperson’s
private information about customers. We apply our model in a rich empirical setting in microfinance and
illustrate how to address various identification and estimation challenges. We extend two-step estimation
methods used for unidimensional compensation plans by embedding a flexible machine learning (random
forest) model in the first-stage multitasking policy function estimation within an iterative procedure that
accounts for salesperson heterogeneity and private information. Estimates reveal two latent segments of
salespeople—a “hunter” segment that is more efficient in loan acquisition and a “farmer” segment that is
more efficient in loan collection. Counterfactuals reveal heterogeneous effects: hunters’ private information
hurts the firm as they engage in adverse selection; farmers’ private information helps the firm as they use it
to better collect loans. The payoff complementarity induced by multiplicative incentive aggregation softens
adverse specialization by hunters relative to additive aggregation, but hurts performance among farmers.
Overall, task specialization in job design for hunters (acquisition) and farmers (collection) hurts the firm as
adverse selection harm overwhelms efficiency gain.
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information, adverse selection, moral hazard, personnel economics, organizational economics
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1. Introduction
Personal selling employs approximately 10% of the US labor workforce; selling-related
expenditures are about 5% of the US GDP at approximately $1 trillion (Zoltners et al.
2008). These shares are even greater in the retail, financial services, automobile, banking,
consulting, and technology sectors (Misra 2019). As a benchmark, the total advertising
spending in the United States as of 2019 is around $200 billion. Despite the potential for
substantial gains from effective salesforce management, research remains limited relative
to advertising. Recently, the availability of rich data on compensation plans and salesforce
performance has led to a spurt of empirical research (e.g, Misra and Nair 2011, Chung et al.
2013, Chan et al. 2014) but these papers only study single task salesforces with incentive
plans based on unidimensional metrics of performance (e.g., sales). A recent survey of
compensation practices, however, showed that over 86% of firms use multiple metrics of
performance for salesforce compensation (WorldatWork 2016). Further, this literature has
not considered the efficiency–moral hazard concerns arising from private information that
salespeople have about customers relative to the firm—arising from their greater proximity
and ongoing relationships with customers.
In this paper, we broaden the focus of empirical research in salesforce management
to include multitasking settings with multidimensional incentives, where salespeople have
private information about customers. This allows us to ask novel substantive questions
around (i) the design of multidimensional incentives (ii) task allocation and job design,
and (iii) managing the costs and benefits of a salesperson’s private information. To this
end, the paper introduces the first structural model of a multitasking salesforce in response
to multidimensional incentives. The model also accommodates (i) dynamic intertemporal
tradeoffs in effort choice across the tasks and (ii) salesperson’s private information about
customers. Finally, we apply our model in a rich empirical setting in microfinance and
illustrate how to address the various identification and estimation challenges involved in
estimating such a model. The features of the model and our solution to various estimation
challenges considerably expand the range of employee incentive problems and settings for
which structural modeling can be applied.
We first elaborate on the three substantive questions we address, and then describe the
empirical context to motivate the critical and novel features of our structural model. In
terms of substantive issues, we first consider the design of multidimensional incentives for
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multitasking employees. In practice, firms typically aggregate performance across multiple
tasks (or performance dimensions) additively using a weighted average of performance on
each task (e.g., Hong et al. 2018, Bartel 2017, Lu 2012). Researchers also mostly model
additive aggregation (e.g., Holmström and Milgrom 1991, Athey and Roberts 2001, Bond
and Gomes 2009, Ederer et al. 2018). However, when there are production complementar-
ities across tasks, additive aggregation can lead to misalignment between the salesperson
and firm incentives. As MacDonald and Marx (2001) show, if the salesperson’s payoffs
do not consider the production complementarities across tasks, the salesperson considers
each task as a substitute for the other, and allocates more time on the task that is easier
for her at the expense of the firm; they dub this focus on the easier task even when the
firm prefers more distributed effort across tasks as “adverse specialization.” Therefore, in
jobs involving production complementarities across tasks, incentive design should consider
ways to induce payoff complementarities across tasks to improve incentive alignment. One
approach we will consider to create payoff complementarities and reduce misalignment is
to use multiplicative aggregation because payoffs will be higher when efforts are allocated
more equally across tasks. This is particularly relevant in our empirical context because
the focal firm uses multiplicative aggregation of performance across tasks.
Next, we consider the problem of job design—how should a firm allocate tasks among
sales employees? The issue was first addressed in Holmström and Milgrom (1991), who laid
the theoretical foundations for the study of job design and task allocation in a principal-
agent framework. This paper considers the following questions: Should tasks be divided
across employees, with each employee assigned a specialized task? Or should each employee
have joint responsibility across multiple tasks? The answers depend on the fundamen-
tal specialization–multitasking trade-off, i.e., while specialization can increase efficiency
because each employee works on tasks to which she is better suited, multitasking can
produce efficiency gains by internalizing the production complementarities across tasks.
Which of these two effects dominates is an important and interesting empirical question.1
Finally, we consider how firms can manage the costs and benefits of the salesperson’s
private information. Private information can benefit the firm if salespeople can use it to
1 It is potentially possible to have teams of employees be responsible for the joint outcomes across multiple tasks,
with individual salespeople specializing in a task. In this paper, we abstract away from team-based job design.
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be more productive, but it can also hurt the firm when salespeople use it to generate com-
pensation at the expense of the firm. For example, if a salesperson has private information
about a customer’s ability to repay a loan, acquiring such a loan when the private informa-
tion is unfavorable will help the salesperson gain short-term commissions at the expense of
the firm profitability. A standard tool used by managers is to periodically transfer employ-
ees out of their territories to eliminate their private information. We evaluate the costs
and benefits of using periodic transfers for firms.
Our empirical application is in the context of a microfinance institution’s salesforce
(loan officers) that is responsible for both loan acquisition and loan collection. The context
has close parallels to the customer relationship management (CRM) literature, in which
sales employees may either specialize or be jointly responsible for customer acquisition and
retention. The empirical context requires us to incorporate two significant features into our
structural model of multitasking. The first is a “dynamic intertemporal tradeoff” in effort
allocation across new loan acquisition and repayment tasks when there is heterogeneity in
loan repayment probabilities. For example, a salesperson acquiring easier-to-acquire loans
today to do well on the acquisition metric must be concerned about the tradeoff on future
payoffs because such a customer is less likely to repay the loans. The second is “private
information.” Salespeople have private information about their customers’ profitability
unavailable to the firm, and this information can impact their choice of effort allocation
across tasks. While private information may help improve efficiency by allowing salespeople
to target the right customers for acquisition and repayment, it can also lead to incentive
misalignment and lower firm profits because it can encourage the salesperson to selectively
acquire the easier-to-acquire “bad” customers, who are less likely to repay.
Beyond modeling, these two features also have relevance for our substantive questions.
The dynamic intertemporal tradeoff between acquisition and repayment produces a produc-
tion and payoff complementarity, especially in the presence of private information because
firms have less information than salespeople about whether a loan is more likely to be good
or bad. Putting in more effort to acquire good loans means less effort is needed to main-
tain those loans for the salesperson. As discussed before, the production complementarity
between the acquisition and repayment tasks has implications for job design. Further, given
the inbuilt payoff complementarity in performance across the two tasks, it is theoretically
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and empirically interesting as to why our focal firm uses multiplicative aggregation of per-
formance on loan acquisition and repayment. We assess whether multiplicative aggregation
is needed to improve alignment and whether additive and multiplicative aggregation have
qualitatively different effects on loan officer segments with different relative costs for tasks.
We estimate the structural model of multitasking by loan officers at the bank using
data on salesforce performance and compensation matched with the loans generated by
the loan officers and information about the loan characteristics and repayment outcomes.
It is useful to consider the features of the data that allow us to incorporate features such
as multitasking and private information relative to the existing structural literature on
salesforce compensation. First, in contrast to the existing literature, which observes only
sales performance outcomes, we observe not only new loan acquisition volumes but also
the repayment performance on past loans, which allows us to model the multitasking effort
in both acquisition and maintenance to collect loans. Second, there are several features of
the data that allow us to study the role of private information. We observe ex-post loan
repayment behavior for individual loans in combination with ex-ante loan characteristics,
and salesperson states that impact incentives to exploit private information at the time
of loan acquisition and maintenance. By controlling the effect of observed ex-ante loan
characteristics and salesperson states, we can back out the unobservable private type of
each loan. Further, the bank’s random transfer policy creates an exogenous variation on
whether salespeople have private information, which allows us to identify differences in
effort allocated when salespeople have private information or not. While this variation
is not necessary for model identification, it provides overidentifying restrictions for the
structural model and descriptive evidence in support of differences in behavior that is
consistent with the structural model’s predictions when there is no private information.
Our estimation strategy extends and adapts the two-step estimation strategy in Chung
et al. (2013) to estimate a structural model of a multitasking salesforce with unobserved
salesperson heterogeneity and private information. We use the EM algorithm estimation
framework in Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) that estimate their dynamic structural model
using the iterative decomposition approach in Arcidiacono and Jones (2003) to accommo-
date latent class heterogeneity.
Next, we explain the estimation challenges in accommodating multitasking and private
information and how we address them. First, with multitasking (acquisition/maintenance)
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and private information (good/bad loans), salespeople must decide on four levels of effort
related to the acquisition and maintenance of good and bad loans. Hence, the nonpara-
metric first stage estimation is significantly more complicated than in Chung et al. (2013)
which use a Chebyshev polynomial approximation. Here we use a machine learning model—
random forest with cross-validation— for flexibly estimating the first-stage nonparametric
effort policy functions while avoiding overfitting. Second, although the salesperson has pri-
vate information about loans and hence can tell ex-ante loan types, the researchers cannot
directly observe it. A particular challenge here is that salespeople can affect loan outcomes
through their effort choices. Hence, we need to infer ex-ante loan types from ex-post loan
outcomes, controlling for the salesperson’s state variables and the salesperson’s latent class.
We develop an algorithm to jointly infer the ex-ante loan types and the salesperson’s latent
class in the first stage of the two-step estimation procedure.
Our estimation results reveal two distinct segments of loan officers: a larger “hunter”
segment and a smaller “farmer” segment. We find that the “hunter” type segment has a
relatively low acquisition cost and is more efficient at “hunting” for new customers, whereas
the “farmer” type segment has a relatively low maintenance cost and is more efficient at
“farming” existing customers to obtain repayments. The hunters are also more effective
in using private information than the farmers in that they can more effectively identify
and acquire the easier-to-acquire segment of lower quality customers. Thus, they are more
likely to indulge in moral hazard through adverse customer selection.
Our first counterfactual shows a nuanced tradeoff in the heterogeneous relative impact of
additive versus multiplicative aggregation of performance across tasks. Consistent with the
insights in MacDonald and Marx (2001), we find that the multiplicative aggregation (which
induces additional payoff complementarities over the additive aggregation) helps the firm
avoid adverse specialization by preventing the hunter segment from focusing excessively on
acquiring new loans, especially bad ones. However, the multiplicative aggregation backfires
with the farmer segment due to their high (low) cost to acquire (maintain) loans by
forcing them to spend more effort on the acquisition, generating more bad loans that
become delinquent than they would have with additive aggregation. Our results thus add
theoretical nuance to the additive versus multiplicative aggregation debate.
Our second counterfactual examines a largely unexplored managerial question in the
salesforce literature on the allocation of tasks across salespeople with heterogeneous capa-
bilities. In particular, we address the specialization–multitasking tradeoff in job design. As
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our estimates indicate that there is a hunter segment and a farmer segment, a natural “spe-
cialization” based job design for the bank is the allocation of all acquisition tasks to the
hunter segment and all maintenance tasks to the farmer segment. We find that the firm is
better off with multitasking—by making salespeople responsible for both loan acquisition
and maintenance. In other words, the cost of adverse customer selection by salespeople
due to incentive misalignment between the complementary acquisition and repayment task
dominates the efficiency gains obtained from specialization.
Finally, our third counterfactual on transfers shows that private information is a double-
edged sword with heterogeneous effects: hunters abuse it to generate easier-to-acquire but
less profitable loans, but farmers take advantage of it to monitor and collect loans selec-
tively. Thus, hunters’ usage of private information hurts the firm, whereas farmers’ usage
of private information helps the firm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature and
positions the current paper. Section 3 describes the institutional setting and data. Sections
4 and 5 describe the model and estimation respectively. Section 6 discusses the model
estimates while Section 7 reports the findings from counterfactuals. Section 8 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Our paper contributes to several streams of literature. First, our paper is related to the
theoretical literature on the multitasking principal-agent model (see, e.g., Holmström and
Milgrom 1991, Baker et al. 1994, Dixit 2002). A key finding of this literature is that incen-
tivizing one among multiple tasks can lead to the agent shirking on other tasks. Holmström
and Tirole (1993), for example, find that incentive schemes that reward only immediately
realized profits can lead agents to sacrifice long-run profits. To solve this moral hazard
problem, Godes (2004) proposes the division of labor among salespeople who work on tech-
nologically substitutable tasks. In contrast, MacDonald and Marx (2001) consider the case
of multitasking with production complementarities across tasks. Here the principal prefers
the agent to spread effort across tasks, but the agent prefers to spend more effort only on
less costly tasks under an additive performance aggregation based scheme. They refer to
this outcome as “adverse specialization.” To address this, they suggest the use of incentive
contracts with payoff complementarity across task outcomes to improve incentive align-
ment with the principal. Our focal firm uses multiplicative performance aggregation, which
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naturally induces payoff complementarities. However, in our application, even with additive
incentives, there is payoff complementarity. We, therefore, assess whether multiplicative
aggregation is needed to improve alignment and whether additive and multiplicative aggre-
gation have qualitatively different effects on loan officer segments with different relative
cost for performing the multiple tasks.
Second, our paper is related to the empirical literature on multitasking. Agarwal and
Wang (2009) and Agarwal and Ben-David (2018) exploit an exogenous change in the
compensation structure of a bank in the US to show that sales incentives encourage loan
officers to take excessive risk and this increases defaults. To address this issue, they argue
that incentives must be complementary in terms of performance across multiple tasks.
Using commercial bank data, Behr et al. (2019) find that the multidimensional contract is
effective for stimulating overall greater effort. In the same setting as the current paper, Kim
et al. (2019) find evidence of private information that leads to salesperson moral hazard
in the form of adverse loan selection, i.e., salespeople’s acquisition incentives incentivize
them to acquire low-quality loans. They also find that because loan officers are responsible
for loan maintenance as well as acquisition, the maintenance incentives mitigate adverse
selection in loan acquisition. In contrast, Bracha and Fershtman (2012) do not find evidence
of a distorting effect of the multi-dimensional pay-for-performance scheme. Our paper adds
to the literature by developing a structural framework to address multitasking dynamics
in the presence of private information.
To the best of our knowledge, empirical work on job design is scarce despite a highly
influential theoretical paper by Holmström and Milgrom (1991). A notable exception is
Baker and Hubbard (2003), who study the effect of new technology on asset ownership and
job design in the trucking industry. Our paper contributes to this literature by evaluating
task allocation schemes in job design using the dynamic structural framework. Interest-
ingly, making salespeople responsible for managing ongoing customer relationships can be
thought of as giving salespeople an “ownership stake” in the customers they acquire, and
thus incentivizing them to acquire better customer “assets” and maintain them.
Our paper is most closely related to the empirical literature on salesforce compensation.
Although the early work tended to take the form of descriptive analyses of salesforce com-
pensation practices and involve testing predictions of the principal-agent theory in com-
pensation plan design (e.g., Joseph and Kalwani 1998, Coughlan and Narasimhan 1992),
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there has recently been a surge of work that estimates structural models using data from
salesforce performance outcomes in response to incentive schemes at the firm (e.g., Misra
and Nair 2011, Chung et al. 2013). As discussed before, these papers have been focused
on single-task salesforces. By expanding our focus to multitasking with multidimensional
incentives accounting for intertemporal dynamics across tasks and private information,
the paper considerably expands the salesforce and employee incentive settings in which
structural modeling can be applied. In marketing, the features of our model can be easily
adapted to managing salesforces in CRM settings, where firms need to balance customer
acquisition, retention, and growth over time.
3. Institutional Setting and Data
This section describes the institutional setting, provides details of the data and descriptive
evidence in support of the modelling choices.
3.1. Institutional Details
Our empirical setting is a Mexican microfinance bank. As is typical in microfinance, given
the needs of the target segment, the loans are made without collateral on relatively small
amounts (the average amount is $670), with a high interest rate (the average monthly
rate is 7.3%), and short maturity periods (the average length is 4.1 months). Despite the
7.3% monthly interest rate, the average monthly return of the loans is 5.0%, indicating
that the delinquency rate is very high, as is fairly common in the microfinance sector in
emerging markets (Sengupta and Aubuchon 2008). Most customers are small businesses
(e.g., grocery shop owners, tailors).
The bank hires salespeople to accomplish two tasks: acquiring new loans and collecting
repayments. The empirical setting is ideal for studying multitasking because the loan
officers at the bank are jointly responsible for both loan acquisition and loan maintenance
to ensure repayment. At the acquisition stage, loan officers recruit borrowers through
referrals or personal visits, accept loan applications, and then recommend loan terms to
the bank. The bank gives the loan officers discretion in not only whether to approve a loan
but also the terms of the loan (e.g., loan amount, loan duration).
The bank only decides on the interest rate based on public information about the bor-
rower (i.e., a 1− 5 credit rating with 5 as best, constructed with data from an external
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agency) and its history with the customer. Hence, loan officers have no incentive to mis-
report. At the maintenance stage, the loan officers use phone calls and in-person visits to
ensure timely repayments.
Salesperson j’s monthly compensation in period t is denoted as Wjt(1+Bjt), where fixed
salary (Wjt) is determined solely by seniority, not performance, and bonus index (Bjt)
depends on customer acquisition and maintenance performance. The bonus is bounded
below by zero and is incremental to salary; hence the loan officers have limited liability.
Acquisition performance is benchmarked against one’s past performance to generate
an acquisition index (Acquisition index Ajt is defined as Ajt = Njt/Qjt where Njt is the
amount of new loans acquired by officer j at period t, and Qjt is the acquisition quota,
which depends on the amount of existing loans of officer j at the beginning of period t).
Maintenance index is based on the value of collected loans relative to that of outstanding
loans (Mjt = g(Rjt/Ojt)), where Rjt is the amount of repaid loans collected by officer j,
Ojt is the outstanding value of loans in salesperson j’s portfolio due at period t, and
g(.) is an increasing step function detailed in Table A1 in the appendix. The final bonus
is the product of the base salary, acquisition index, and maintenance index (i.e., Bjt =
WjtAjtMjt); thus, receiving zero points in any category would earn no bonus at all. Note
that the maintenance index, which holds the salesperson account for repayment of the loans
that she acquired, aligns the incentive between the salesperson and the firm. Using the
index, the firm effectively transfers the partial ownership of an ongoing asset to salespeople.
Since the bonus incentives are based on a combination of acquisition and maintenance
performance, the officers have to not only balance their efforts between acquisition and
maintenance tasks at each point of time, but they also have to consider a dynamic intertem-
poral trade-off between the short-term benefits of acquiring (possibly lower quality) cus-
tomers to improve acquisition performance and its long-term adverse effects on mainte-
nance performance.2
In our setting, loan officers obtain private information about customers’ quality, unob-
servable to the firm, since customer engagement with the bank exclusively happens through
salespeople at customer premises. Salespeople not only infer customers’ motives, needs,
2 Theoretically, salespeople may game the timing of loan acquisition, but given the borrower’s liquidity constraints
in microfinance settings, this is practically a second-order effect. We abstract away from the issue in this paper.
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financial capabilities/liabilities, and outside options but also observe how well each cus-
tomer is running his business, or if a customer is experiencing unexpected financial hard-
ship.3 It is almost impossible for the bank (or its managers) to access such private infor-
mation. Salespeople can use the private information in allocating effort on acquiring and
maintaining loans because it affects the salesperson’s payoff through its direct impact on
the probability of delinquency and the cost of acquiring and maintaining loans.
In retail banking, transfers are used as a standard policy to avoid potential abuse of
private information by loan officers through adverse selection in new loans to customers
(Fisman et al. 2017). Our focal bank also follows a transfer policy; however, it goes further
than typical banks in that who is transferred and where they are transferred to are entirely
random by design. This prevents loan officers from engaging in potential moral hazard
behaviors when they expect to be transferred. Such “instant” transfers are feasible because
the bank operates within one large metropolitan area.
A (randomly) transferred salesperson takes over and monitors the loans acquired by the
predecessor who left the branch. After a transfer, the transferred salesperson’s maintenance
performance is assessed only on the loans at the new branch she took over, thus making her
portfolio exogenous upon transfer. Justified by descriptive evidence, we assume that there
is a learning period after transfer for salespeople to acquire private information; during the
learning period, they do not have any private information.
3.2. Data
Our data consist of the following: (1) salesperson-level data that contain each salesperson’s
characteristics, and monthly performance and compensation as analyzed in the previous
empirical salesforce compensation literature and (2) loan-level transaction data that con-
tain each loan’s characteristics and monthly repayment outcomes. The two datasets are
matched based on the identity of a salesperson who originates or monitors each loan in
each period.4 The data we use for estimation include the performance and compensa-
tion outcomes of 229 salespeople over a 14-month period from January 2009 to February
3 Salespeople acquire private information not just on existing loans but also on prospects for new loans. Because
new loans are often given to repeat customers, salespeople interact with new prospects during the learning period.
Furthermore, knowledge of the neighborhood (e.g., market condition, demand, competition) gained during the learning
period helps officers make better inferences about new customers’ financial credibility.
4 Salespeople were removed from the final sample if their aggregate performance did not match with the compensation
index, possibly because loans that contributed to their bonus are missing in our data. We also dropped 29,589 loans
from the data that could not be matched to salespeople.
12 Kim, Sudhir and Uetake: A Structural Model of a Multitasking Salesforce
2010. In all, we obtain 2,648 observations (months of performance outcomes and com-
pensation) across the 229 salespeople. The performance and compensation outcomes are
aggregated/summarized from the 100,250 loans for which we observe detailed repayment
outcome data over the life of the loan.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of our salesperson panel data. Out of the 2,648
salesperson-month observations in the data, 4.8% of observations have transfers. A total of
22.3% of the salespeople experience at least one transfer during our 14-month observation
window. The average tenure is 25.5 months, and they acquire 347,470 pesos (approximately
US$25,365 as of 2009) of new loans, have 888,300 pesos (approximately US$64,845) of
loans in the portfolio, and collect 772,847 pesos (approximately US$56,415) in repayment
each month.5 The acquisition index benchmarked against the quota is 0.82 on average (i.e.,
salespeople achieve 82% of quota on average), and the maintenance index benchmarked
against the amount of loans in the portfolio is 0.86 on average. On average, the loan officers’
bonus was 55. In the third panel of the table, we report Figure 1 displays the distribution
of Acquisition, Maintenance, and Bonus indices.
Table 1 Summary Statistics
N Distribution
Transfer 2648 Yes (4.8%)
Number of Transfer 229 0 (77.7%), 1 (21.0%), 2+ (1.3%)
Salesperson-month level N Mean SD Min Max
Tenure (months) 2352 25.51 21.69 1 143
New Loan Amount (1000 pesos) 2648 347.5 326 10 3066
Monthly Outstanding Loan Amount (1000 pesos) 2648 888.3 748.2 0 5209
Monthly Repayment Amount (1000 pesos) 2648 772.8 695.8 0 5052.7
Acquisition Quota (1000 pesos) 2648 429.2 492.8 13.2 2938.8
Acquisition Index (A) 2648 0.82 0.42 0.02 3.19
Maintenance Index (M) 2648 0.86 0.23 0 1.25
Bonus Index (A ∗M) 2648 0.55 0.3 0 2.35
Branch-month level N Mean SD Min Max
Number of salespeople 1014 2.44 1.17 1 8
Total New Loan Amount (1000 pesos) 1014 1050.29 797.21 25 5168
Total Repayment Amount (1000 pesos) 1014 610.4 788.4 0 7146.5
Average Acquisition Index (A) 1014 0.82 0.35 0.02 2.1
Average Maintenance Index (M) 1014 0.85 0.20 0 1.2
Average Bonus Index (A ∗M) 1014 0.55 0.25 0 1.56
5 The regression of the new loan amount (repayment amount) on the salesperson fixed effect and the branch fixed
effect, respectively, show that the branch fixed effect does not capture the large variation in those variables.
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Figure 1 Distribution of Bonus Indices
(a) Acquisition Index (b) Maintenance Index (c) Bonus Index
According to the firm’s policy, the acquisition quota, Qjt is a function of the amount
of outstanding loans in salesperson j’s portfolio at the beginning of period t, Ojt, and the
lagged acquisition quota Qj,t−1. Since we do not know the exact formula for the acquisition
quota Qjt, we will infer the transition of quota based on the observed data.
Next, Table 2 summarizes the distribution of loans, performance, and loan terms by
credit rating. The credit rating information comes from an external credit agency, and
the agency determines it based on the borrower’s financial history across institutions.
Most of the loans are given to customers with the highest credit rating. As expected, loan
performance, as measured by ex-post IRR, and delinquency probability of each loan is
highly correlated with credit rating. Thus, we expect the proportion of good type loans to
increase by credit rating monotonically. As for the loan terms, interest rates are roughly
the same across credit ratings. This is because the interest rates are determined by the
firm based on the borrower’s history with the firm, and all first-time borrowers typically
start at the highest rate, and the rate goes down if they repay loans well. The loan amount
has a very high standard deviation across all credit ratings, and there is no systematic
relationship between the loan amount and credit ratings. Lastly, loan duration tends to be
shorter for borrowers with a better rating.
Table 2 Loan Performance and Terms by Credit Rating
Rating N IRR (%) Delinquency Prob Interest rate (%) Amount (pesos) Duration (months)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
1 3,269 45.68 44.62 0.72 0.35 88.63 9.82 7839.8 6212.2 10.2 6.31
2 2,125 53.15 39.59 0.67 0.36 86.46 9.51 10517.5 9777.3 10.11 6.63
3 5,110 67.12 35.68 0.5 0.38 87.97 8.63 9792.6 8483.3 8.03 4.16
4 18,127 79.17 24.02 0.27 0.31 85.99 7.34 8639.6 8770.4 5.9 3.62
5 71,619 87.45 19.7 0.16 0.22 87.76 19.7 8662.8 8624.5 5.66 3.23
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3.3. Descriptive Evidence
In this section, we first verify that transfers are indeed random as per firm policy and, there-
fore, exogenous to loan officer characteristics and performance. We then present descriptive
evidence for two key features underlying the structural model— (i) how salesperson’s pri-
vate information, driven by transfer, affects her choice of acquisition and maintenance
effort of each loan type; and (ii) how salesperson’s current portfolio shapes her mainte-
nance pressure, which impacts her choice on acquisition effort and maintenance effort of
each loan type.
3.3.1. Randomness of Transfers: As noted earlier, the firm’s salesperson transfer pol-
icy is random by design—in terms of timing and transfer location. To verify randomness,
we test whether the transfer at time t for a salesperson j can be predicted by the sales-
person’s performance (acquisition or maintenance index) in the previous period, tenure, or
length of time since last transfer. Table 3 reports the result of linear probability models
with Transfer as a binary dependent variable, and salesperson’s observable characteristics
or past performances as explanatory variables.6 We show that Transfer is not significantly
related to the salesperson’s acquisition and maintenance index in the previous period with
period fixed effects included (Models 1, 2 and 3), salesperson characteristics such as tenure
and length of time since last transfer included (Models 4 and 5), and with all of the
variables when considered altogether (Model 6).7
Given this, we treat random transfers as exogenous variation in salesperson private
information.
3.3.2. Effect of Private Information on Acquisition and Maintenance Performance:
To assess whether the loss of private information after a transfer impacts effort allocation,
we test whether the IRR of loans acquired and the probability of loan delinquency at
the time of maintenance (conditional on credit rating) differ during the learning period
when there is no private information. We assume a one month learning period for private
information (see Appendix B for the analysis that justifies this assumption). Figure 2a
6 We also tried a specification with branch fixed effects and one with mean branch-level return. We find the coefficient
on those variables are also not statistically significant. Despite the magnitudes being far away from zero, we note that
the sign of the coefficients are not always consistent with poor performance.
7 In unreported results, we find that the coefficients are still insignificant when we include past performance up to 3
months before (t− 3), salesperson’s marital status and position in the firm, and average bonus index of salespeople
in the branch.
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Table 3 Randomness of Transfer
DV: Transfer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Acquisition -0.253 -0.256 -1.605
Index (t-1) (0.274) (0.276) (1.213)
Maintenance 0.00725 0.0490 1.145




Time Since -0.399 -0.279
Last Transfer (0.350) (0.313)
Intercept
-2.865*** -3.060*** -2.903*** -3.207*** -3.132*** -3.383
(0.488) (0.593) (0.609) (0.164) (0.836) (2.410)
Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1637 1640 1637 2352 781 781
shows the ex post IRR of loans acquired by salespeople with private information (during
the non-learning period) is lower than that of loans acquired by salespeople without pri-
vate information (during the learning period). This suggests that salespeople at the loan
acquisition stage use their private information to selectively bring in lower-quality loans,
which are easier to acquire. Figure 2b shows that when there is private information, loan
delinquency probabilities are lower. This suggests that salespeople are able to use their
private information to appropriately target their efforts on the right loans to improve loan
maintenance. Overall, the descriptive evidence above implies that private information can
either benefit or hurt the firm’s profit; it can increase efficiency by allowing salespeople to
target the right customers for maintenance, but also enhance the incentive misalignment
between salespeople and the firm by encouraging salespeople to selectively acquire the
easier-to-acquire, less profitable customers. Additional regressions that control for loan and
salesperson observables, incentive states, and fixed effects that replicate these conclusions
are presented in Kim et al. (2019).
3.3.3. Effect of Maintenance Pressure on Loan Performance: Next, we provide
descriptive evidence on how the use of maintenance performance for incentives impact
acquisition and maintenance behavior. To graphically show the evidence, we divide periods
into two groups based on the level of maintenance pressure. We consider a salesperson is
under high maintenance pressure in period t, if her portfolio is composed of more delin-
quent loans than usual, i.e., the ratio of the amount of delinquent loans to the amount
of outstanding loans at the end of period t− 1 was higher than her median value of the
ratios across periods. Figure 3a shows the acquired loans’ quality as a function of credit
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Figure 2 Effect of Private Information (Learning period: one month after transfer)
(a) On Acquired Loan Quality (b) On Loan Delinquency at Maintenance
rating by maintenance pressure. The loan quality is represented by the average ex post
annual IRR of loans acquired in period t on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis has the
loans’ public credit rating. Note that the maintenance pressure is measured at the time of
loan acquisition, and the acquired loans’ ex-post IRR is measured after the loan cycle is
completed. The average IRR of the acquired loans is higher when the share of delinquent
loans is above the median for every rating level. In other words, a loan officer is likely to
acquire higher-quality loans under higher pressure of ensuring sufficient repayment from
the loans in their portfolio. Figure 3b shows the average delinquency probability of loans
when a salesperson collects loans under high and low maintenance pressure. Note that the
maintenance pressure and the loan delinquencies are measured in the same period. The
average delinquency probability is higher (lower) for the salespeople under lower (higher)
pressure, who have lower-than-median delinquent loans in their portfolio.
These graphs show that maintenance pressure affects both the salesperson acquisition
and maintenance effort. Therefore, we include the salesperson’s portfolio states, such as
the amount of delinquent loans or the amount of outstanding loans in each period, as state
variables in the effort policy functions.
4. Model
Given the above descriptive evidence, we now develop a dynamic structural model of a
multitasking salesforce in the presence of private information. A salesperson exerts effort
on acquisition and maintenance tasks in response to the multidimensional incentive scheme
discussed above. Further, the salesperson with private information about customer prof-
itability takes into account the dynamic trade-off of acquiring or maintaining different types
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Figure 3 Effect of Maintenance Pressure
(a) On Acquired Loan Quality (b) On Loan Delinquency at Maintenance
of loans. The loan types are private information to the salesperson. While bad (riskier)
(conditional on public information) loans are easier to acquire, they are more likely to
go delinquent in the future, thus hurting maintenance performance and requiring greater
maintenance effort in the future. We model unobservable ex ante loan types in the pop-
ulation as a discrete binary distribution—“good” (ex-ante profitable, harder-to-acquire
loans) and “bad” (ex-ante unprofitable, and easier-to-acquire loans), where the proportion
of good types in the population can vary by observable credit rating.
Figure 4 describes the timing of the model within a period (month). For a salesperson,
each period is either a learning period (where she does not have private information) or
a non-learning period (where she has private information). The salesperson observes the
compensation plan and her states in the period. Over the period, the salesperson chooses
effort level on the multiple dimensions–and this varies by whether the salesperson has pri-
vate information or not. At the end of the period, the outcomes are realized depending on
both effort and shocks, and then the salesperson receives compensation based on the real-
ized performance outcomes. Lastly, the states are updated based on the realized outcomes.
The model repeats every period.
We next elaborate on the seven elements of the model: private information, compensation
plan, actions, state variables, performance outcome functions, state transitions, flow utility
function, and the Bellman equation.
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In this section, we describe how we operationalize the presence or absence of private infor-
mation. Based on our descriptive evidence, we treat the month right after transfer as a
learning period without private information for that salesperson and all other periods as
periods with private information about loan types (good or bad). Since transfers are uncor-
related to loan officer characteristics and performance, the presence or absence of private
information is exogenous in the model.8
4.2. Compensation Plan
The salesperson receives a fixed monthly salary and a bonus.9 The bonus is based on com-
posite performance along the acquisition and maintenance tasks. Acquisition performance
is measured using an acquisition index Ajt of salesperson j in period t. Specifically, and as
explained in Section 3, Ajt =Njt/Qjt, where Njt is the amount of new loans acquired and
Qjt is the acquisition quota. The quota-setting policy is described in section 4.4.
Maintenance performance is measured using a maintenance index Mjt = g(Rjt/Ojt),
where Rjt is the amount of repaid loans, Ojt is the outstanding value and g(·) is an increas-
ing function of Rjt/Ojt, The details of the g(·) function are in Appendix. The overall bonus
compensation is a product of the two indices: Bjt =Ajt×Mjt. Since the bonus is bounded
below by zero and is incremental to salary, salespeople have limited liability. It implies
8 Since transfers in our empirical setting are completely random, we treat private information as exogenous. We
deterministically classify periods as those with private information versus not based on time since a transfer. More
generally, the presence or absence of private information can be probabilistically modeled using exogenous instruments
(even at the level of each consumer), and integrated over the probabilities to model performance outcomes with and
without private information. Potential instruments for private information in such settings could include: number and
depth of past interactions between salesperson and customer, salesperson tenure, demographic similarities between
salesperson and customer.
9 In the model, we normalize salary to 1 and model the salesperson’s behavior to earn Bjt only, because (i) we do
not observe all salespeople’s salary in all periods, and (ii) there is little variation in salary across salespeople; the
coefficient of variation is only 5.5%.
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that the bank still faces the tradeoff between risk and efficiency even if the agent is risk
neutral.10
4.3. Actions
The salesperson’s set of actions depends on whether she has private information (i.e.,
whether she is in the learning period or not). With private information, the salesperson
knows the unobservable loan types and can hence choose four levels of effort: acquisition
effort for good and bad loan types, denoted as eAGjt and e
AB
jt , and maintenance effort for
good and bad loan types, which are denoted as eMGjt and e
MB
jt .
In contrast, without private information, the salesperson cannot distinguish loan types
and therefore can only choose total acquisition effort eAjt and total maintenance effort
eMjt with the expectation that the effort will be allocated to good and bad loan types in
proportion to their population share.11 We assume that the population share of loan types
in each branch/period is common knowledge, and salespeople make their effort allocations
based on this common information. In other words, letting pGjt be the probability of a loan
is a good loan in the branch at which salesperson j works at time t, the acquisition and
maintenance efforts, eAjt and e
M
jt , are allocated to good loans with probability p
G
jt and to
bad loans with probability 1− pGjt.
4.4. State Variables
For a salesperson without private information, the state variables sAjt that determine acqui-
sition effort eAjt include the amount of outstanding loans Ojt, the amount of loans that
would expire at the end of period Ejt, acquisition quota Qjt, and salesperson tenure τjt.
Ojt and Ejt as well as the amount of loans acquired in period t determine the portfolio size
that the salesperson j needs to collect from in the next period as we will discuss in Section
4.6. Acquisition quota Qjt directly affects e
A
jt through the acquisition index. We include τjt
as a state variable to proxy salesperson j’s ability and knowledge.
Similarly, maintenance effort eMjt is affected by the amount of outstanding loans, the
lagged amount of repaid loans Rjt−1, and tenure. The amount of repaid loans in period
10 There is a substantial theoretical literature that shows incentives need not be unbounded even for risk neutral agents
in the presence of limited liability—specifically a discrete bonus on attaining quota can attain first best outcomes
(e.g., Park 1995 and Kim 1997). Oyer (2000a) further shows that the discrete bonus contract is optimal among the set
of compensation schemes when agents have outside options and therefore principal needs to share rents with agent.
11 We assume that in the learning period, salespeople do not infer the quality of the loans they maintain based on the
acquirer information. Given the minimal interactions between salespeople in our empirical context, it is not practically
feasible to infer private information.
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t− 1 (Rjt−1) provides information on the repayment likelihood of existing loans, and thus
impact the maintenance pressure on salesperson j. The amount of loans that expires at the
end of period Ejt does not matter in maintenance effort decision, which takes into account
the portfolio size in the current period only.
A salesperson with private information has additional state variables because she can
track the amount of outstanding loans and the amount of expiring loans by loan type. State
variables sAGjt that determine acquisition effort for good loans e
AG
jt include the amount of
outstanding good loans OGjt, the amount of good loans to be expired at the end of period
EGjt, acquisition quota, and tenure. State variables s
AB
jt that affect acquisition effort for bad
type loans eABjt are similarly defined.
Finally, state variables for maintenance efforts for type ω loans, sMωjt (ω ∈ {B,G}), include
the outstanding loan amount of type ω, Oωjt, the lagged amount of repaid type ω loans
Rωj,t−1, and tenure. Table 4 summarizes the state variables for each action.
Table 4 State Variables
Effort Decision
Without Private Information: With Private Information:
State Variables State Variables
Endogenous Outstanding - Good (OGjt),
Acquisition - To-be-Expired - Good (EGjt),
Good (eAGjt ) Endogenous Outstanding amount (Ojt), Acquisition Quota (Qjt),
To-be-Expired amount (Ejt), Exogenous Tenure (τjt)
Acquisition Quota (Qjt), Endogenous Outstanding - Bad (O
B
jt),
Acquisition - Exogenous Tenure (τjt) To-be-Expired - Bad (E
B
jt),
Bad (eABjt ) Acquisition Quota (Qjt),
Exogenous Tenure (τjt)
Endogenous Outstanding - Good, Bad
Maintenance - (OGjt, O
B
jt),
Good (eMGjt ) Endogenous Outstanding amount (Ojt), Lagged Repaid - Good (R
G
jt−1),
Lagged Repaid amount (Rjt−1) Exogenous Tenure (τjt)
Exogenous Tenure (τjt) Endogenous Outstanding - Good, Bad
Maintenance - (OGjt, O
B
jt),




4.5. Salesperson Production Functions
Following Misra and Nair (2011) and Chung et al. (2013), we model the salesperson’s
outcomes as production functions arising from three components: (1) her effort policy
functions; (2) exogenous production shifters and (3) idiosyncratic production shocks not
known to the salesperson when choosing efforts. The key differences with respect to the
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prior research in addressing multidimensional performance with private information are
as follows: (1) we accommodate multiple dimensions of outcomes (acquisition and mainte-
nance); (2) we allow for private information in terms of good and bad loan outcomes; this
also implies that effort choice will also include acquisition and maintenance effort on good
and bad loans and (3) we allow for correlation in the shocks across the outcome equations.
Acquisition outcomes for the salesperson with private information are the amount of new
good loans acquired NGjt ; and the amount of new bad loans N
B











AB) + εABjt ,
(1)
where eAGjt (·;λAG) and e
AG
jt (·;λAB) are the continuous acquisition effort policy function for





jt are idiosyncratic shocks such as unexpected market condition in
each market/period that are neither anticipated nor observed by salesperson j before the
effort choices. Finally, λAω and βAω (ω ∈G,B) are the parameters to be estimated. We will
explain the variables included in Xjt in Section 5.
Note that the acquisition effort policy function for good loans depend on sjt which
include both the state variables associated with other tasks s
\AG
jt as well as the state vari-
ables associated with acquiring good loans sAGjt . e
AG
jt is affected by s
\AG
jt because acquisition
and maintenance efforts are jointly chosen. Hence, outcomes are determined by all state
variables through effort choices for other actions. Note that when the salesperson does not
have private information, the allocation of efforts across loan types is not in the salesper-
son’s control; therefore effort allocation across types is based on the proportion of good
and bad type loans in population.12
In the same manner, we model the maintenance outcomes, the amount of repaid good














MB) + εMBjt ,
(2)









A) + εAGjt ,
NBjt = (1− pGjt)eAjt(sjt;λAB ) + f(Xjt;βA) + εABjt ,
where pGjt is the fraction of good loans in the population, which can vary by salesperson j’s branch over time t.
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where eMGjt (·;λMG) and e
MG
jt (·;λMB) are the continuous maintenance effort policy function
for good and bad loans respectively h(·;βMG) and h(·;βMB) are the effects through exoge-




jt are idiosyncratic shocks. λ
Mω and βMω (ω ∈G,B) are
the parameters to be estimated.






jt to be correlated with one another
to capture the potential correlation in effort decisions and common unexpected market
conditions that affect all acquisition and maintenance outcomes.13 For example, a medical
condition that prevents j from working hard in period t would affect all the acquisition
and maintenance shocks.
4.6. State Transitions
Among the state variables in Table 4, tenure increases by one every period, i.e., τjt+1 =
τjt + 1. All the other state variables in period t+ 1 are reset and exogenously given as j
gets transferred to a new branch at the beginning of t+ 1. In other words, a transferred
salesperson’s amount of outstanding, to-be-expired and lagged repaid loans in the portfolio;
and the acquisition quota are exogenously determined, having nothing to do with her states
in the previous branch in period t before transfer.
Here, we mainly discuss the state transitions when j is not transferred at the beginning
of t+ 1. First, if the states are not distinguished by type, the states in period t+ 1 evolve
from those in period t regardless of presence of private information. Total outstanding
amount follows the deterministic transition:
Ojt+1 =Ojt +Njt−Ejt
where Njt is the amount of acquired loans by salesperson j in period t and Ejt is the amount
of j’s loans to be expired at the end of period t. Acquisition quota Qjt+1 is a function
of the amount of outstanding loans in period t+ 1 (Oj,t+1), acquisition quota in period t
(Qjt) and the unobserved market condition in period t+ 1, although the exact formula is
not known to us. We model the relationship between the explanatory variables and the
acquisition quota in period t+ 1 using a flexible parametric function with parameters φ as
follows:
Qjt+1 = q(Ojt+1,Qjt,zt+1;φ) + νjt+1, (3)
13 Following previous work (e.g., Chung et al. 2013), we do not allow serial correlation of the shocks. Due to the highly
nonlinear nature of the production functions, it is computationally challenging to allow serial correlation; allowing
for serial correlation can be a useful extension.
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where zt+1 represents period fixed effects.
More importantly, the evolution of j’s state variables distinguished by type depends on
the presence of private information in period t. If j is in the learning period in time t (i.e.,
salesperson j does not have private information in period t but has it in t+ 1), j’s states
by type are not observed in t, but observed in period t+ 1. The amounts of outstanding,





w ∈ {G,B}) are exogenously determined at the beginning of t + 1 based on the learnt
private information. If period t is after the learning period (i.e., salesperson j has private












4.7. Flow Utility Function
A salesperson’s flow utility is determined by her bonus given state variables and effort
minus the cost of effort. Salesperson j earns bonus B(Njt,Rjt) based on acquisition and


























otherwise. The utility function for period t is defined by the following:
U(ejt,Njt,Rjt; Θj) =B(Njt,Rjt)−C(ejt; Θj), (4)


















where g(.) is a function that maps maintenance performance to maintenance points as in
Table A1. Note that the salesperson is not risk averse, but the bank cannot assign all risk
to the salesperson due to limited liability (i.e., fixed monthly salary). Therefore the firm
still has to address the moral hazard problem (see, e.g.,Park (1995), Kim (1997), and Oyer
(2000b).)
We specify the effort cost function for the salesperson with private information as follows.
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where θC measures the relative magnitude of effort to (monetary) bonus, θAB is the param-
eter for acquiring bad loans relative to good loans, θM is the parameter for maintenance
effort relative to acquisition effort, θMB is the parameter for maintaining bad loans relative
to good loans. Note that if θM is greater than 1, monitoring effort is costlier than acquisi-
tion effort. We denote Θ =
{
θC ,θAB ,θM ,θMB
}
, on which we do not impose any restrictions
during estimation.14
4.8. Bellman Equation
A salesperson makes effort decisions in a dynamically optimal manner so that she max-
imizes the expected discounted sum of utility given state variables Sjt; state transition
parameters φ; policy function parameters β and λ; j’s belief in the probability of a loan
being a good loan without private information pGjt; and the salesperson’s per-period utility
function that depends on structural parameters Θ. Her Bellman equation can be written
as:
V (S;φ,β,λ,pG, Θ) =maxe
[





where δ is a monthly discount factor, which we assume to be 0.99,15 and S′ is the state
variables for the next period. The expectation is obtained with respect to the idiosyn-
cratic shocks in each period, the probability of being transferred, and the transition from
one month learning period to the post-learning periods. Hence, the salesperson takes the
possibility of transfers and its impact on learning into account.16
4.9. Model Discussion
As we discussed in the introduction, one of our goals in the paper is to develop a workhorse
modeling and estimation framework for the structural analysis of a multitasking salesforce.
The rich empirical setting requires us to incorporate several features into the model, but
special cases or minor adaptations can be applied to a range of other settings.
14 While this specification helps easy interpretation of the relative costs of acquisition, maintenance and effort for good








15 Since this is an infinite horizon setting with only monthly bonuses and no annual bonuses, we use the common
approach of assuming discount factors as in Misra and Nair (2011). This is in contrast to Chung et al. (2013), who
are able to estimate discount factors by exploiting the finite horizon bonus scheme in their empirical setting.
16 As maintenance points are a weakly increasing step function of the share of the repayment amount relative to total
outstanding loan amount of the salesperson, the first-order condition of equation (6) may not equal 0 at the optimal
effort. Nevertheless, there is an optimal solution. In Online Appendix OA2, we show that there is a solution to the
problem with such a weakly increasing step function for maintenance index using a simpler static model.
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First, our model accommodates private information, but special cases of our model
can be used in multitasking salesforce settings without private information. The effort
allocation feature across multiple tasks will continue to be relevant in settings without
private information.
Second, our empirical setting requires a dynamic structural model with forward-looking
behavior salespeople because of the intertemporal linkages between acquisition and repay-
ment. In a setting without such intertemporal linkages, a simpler static model of multi-
tasking can be used. For example, when compensation is based on two dimensions without
intertemporal linkages (e.g., sales quantity and customer satisfaction with sales activities),
a simpler static model would be sufficient.
Finally, in our setting, given observable and exogenous random transfers, we model the
absence or presence of private information deterministically during and after a learning
period. In settings, where such a feature to proxy for private information may not be
available, researchers can consider instruments that are exogenously related to private
information, and model private information as probabilistic. Footnote 8 elaborates this.
5. Estimation and Identification
We estimate the model using two-step forward-simulation based estimation (Bajari et al.
2007). In the first step, we estimate the salesperson’s production function, which includes
the salesperson’s (nonparametric) effort policy functions, with flexible mappings between
states, actions, and performance outcomes. These first-stage effort policy functions are
assumed to reflect the optimal actions of the salesperson, given the observable state vari-
ables. In the second step, we estimate the structural parameters that rationalize the esti-
mated effort policy functions of the first step as optimal. We use moment inequality based
estimation for the second step, where the inequalities are constructed based on the idea
that deviations in effort from the estimated effort policy functions should have lower payoffs
for the salesperson, given that these policies are assumed optimal.
We allow salespeople to be heterogeneous in their cost of customer acquisition and
maintenance. As in Chung et al. (2013), we use an EM-type algorithm by Arcidiacono
and Miller (2011) to accommodate unobserved salesperson heterogeneity and obtain the
heterogeneous effort policy functions with the probability that each salesperson belongs
to one of the (latent) discrete segments in the first step. We then estimate the structural
parameters in the second stage by segment.
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There are two further challenges in estimating the model. First, with multitasking (and
four outcomes in our application), there are many more state variables compared to single-
task settings, whose relationship with the outcome variables need to be nonparametri-
cally estimated. Semiparametric/nonparametric estimation typically faces a severe curse-
of-dimensionality problem when there are many variables. We, therefore, use a machine
learning method for the high-dimensional nonparametric estimation. Specifically, we use
Random Forest with cross-fitting (to avoid over-fitting) to estimate the first-stage policy
functions.
Second, a salesperson with private information makes separate effort decisions for ex ante
good and bad loans. However, the loan type (ex ante profitability) conditional on public
information is not directly observed by researchers. Hence, we need to infer the loan type
from observed ex post realized profitability, controlling for the influence of the salesperson’s
behavior and other exogenous factors. We embed the inference of unobservable loan types
as another iterative step similar to estimating the heterogeneous latent segments.
Figure 5 provides an overview of the steps involved in implementing the two-stage esti-
mation procedure for our application. We explain each of these steps in the following
sub-sections. The first stage estimation is an iterative procedure over Step 1a (for inference
of loan types) and Step 1b (inference of production functions for heterogeneous segments)
until both the loan type classification and the salesperson type segmentation converge. In
the second stage of the estimation, the structural parameters are estimated in Step 2.
5.1. Step 1a: Loan Type Inference
In this step, we infer loan type (i.e., ex ante loan profitability) from ex post loan prof-
itability, or realized Internal Rate of Return (IRR). Since the salesperson can affect ex post
loan profitability through the loan cycle, the ex ante profitability is not directly observed.
More specifically, salespeople with private information selectively acquire loans of differ-
ent quality, so the distribution of good and bad loans they acquire does not follow the
population distribution. Hence, the inference of ex ante loan type requires us to filter out
salesperson factors such as salesperson segments (e.g., if a salesperson is more efficient at
loan acquisition and maintenance) and salesperson states (e.g., how many loans to collect
in this period). We do so in the following steps.
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Figure 5 Estimation Overview
Assume that each salesperson belongs to
each segment with equal probabilities.
Step 1a (Section 5.1.1). Random Forest (RF) Estimation:
ex post IRR as a function of (i) salesperson segments;
(ii) salesperson states; (iii) loan terms.
Step 1a (Section 5.1.2). Prediction of ex ante IRR
using RF parameters, controlling for loan states
Step 1a (Section 5.1.3). Loan type inference:
Good or Bad loans (threshold: average interest rate)
Step 1b (Section 5.2). Salesperson segmentation and
Production function estimation: Arcidiacono and Miller (2011)
Steps 1a (Loan type) and 1b (Salesperson segment) converged?
Step 2 (Section 5.3). Structural parameter estimation:




5.1.1. Mapping between observables and loan profitability. We first model the ex-
post IRR of loan i (IRRi), as a flexible function of observable and unobservable charac-
teristics as follows:
IRRi = f(Li,Kj(i),Statej(i)t...T (i)) +ui, (7)
where Li is the vector of loan/borrower characteristics of loan i, Kj(i) is the latent segment
of salesperson j who acquires loan i, and Statej(i)t...T (i) includes salesperson characteristics
and compensation states during the loan cycle, from the acquisition period t until the
maturity T . We provide the summary statistics of these explanatory variables in the online
appendix. The random forest algorithm allows us to estimate the flexible function f(.),
without making ad-hoc assumptions on the functional form of f(.).
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There are two empirical challenges in estimating equation (7): unobservability of sales-
person segment Kj(i) and potential endogeneity of Statej(i)t...T (i). First, Kj(i) is not directly
observed in the data. We, therefore, iterate on the loan classification step (Step 1a), taking
segment classification as given from the previous step and the heterogeneous (segment-
wise) policy function estimation step (Step 1b) based on the loan classification from the
previous step until both steps converge.
Second, although salesperson characteristics and time-varying compensation states
Statej(i)t...T (i) are observed in the data, unobserved factors (e.g., loan type) may affect
both Statej(i)t...T (i) and IRRi in equation (7), which may bias our inference of ex ante loan
profitability. To handle this endogeneity issue, we instrument Statej(i)t...T (i) with Zj(i)t...T (i),
which affect salesperson compensation states, but do not affect the return of loan i. The
instruments include (i) salesperson j’s transfer status, (ii) the average IRR of the other
loans acquired by salesperson j in period t, and (iii) the average IRR of other loans main-
tained by salesperson j in period t. Such variables affect the compensation states because
they are determined by the aggregate profitability of loans in j’s portfolio, but does not
directly affect IRRi, which is solely determined by loan i’s profitability conditional on
observables.
To implement the 2SLS-like estimation, we first regress the compensation state vari-
ables, Statej(i)t...T (i), on the instruments, Zj(i)t...T (i), and then plug the predicted value
ˆStatej(i)t...T (i) into equation (7) to estimate f(.) with Random Forest.
17 When training the
random forest algorithm, we make use of the information from 60,970 loans, for which there
are no missing predictors. We hold out 30% of the observations for the test data and find
that 1,000 trees with 15 predictors give the best prediction with the lowest mean square
error for the test data. We report the importance of each variable in the online appendix.
5.1.2. Predicting ex ante IRR. Using the estimated Random Forest model, we predict
ex ante profitability of loans, controlling for salesperson factors. The salesperson factors
include salesperson segment Kj(i) and her characteristics/states Statej(i)t...T (i) (e.g., how
many loans to be collected by j on average from period t to T , what fraction of j’s
existing loans are being repaid on average from period t to T ). The last variable shifts the
17 Although this 2SLS-type approach allows a non-parametric function for f(), a caveat is that the asymptotic
properties of the predicted value of f() are not well-established in the literature (Athey et al. 2017). We check the
distribution of the prediction errors, which are centered close to zero.
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salesperson’s maintenance behaviors during the cycle of loan i and eventually affects ex
post IRR of loan i. Specifically, we predict the ex ante IRR ( ˆIRRi) as follows,
ˆIRRi = f̂(Li, K̃j(i), ˜Statej(i)),
where K̃j(i) is the fixed effect for salesperson segment and ˜Statej(i)t...T (i) is the average
compensation states of salesperson j across all loans/periods. We control for the segment
fixed effect in the iterative process between Step 1a and Step 1b.18
To predict ex ante loan profitability, we set Statej(i)t...T (i) at the average compensation
states of salesperson j. The idea is that the the effect of the salesperson’s state on loan
collection (and IRR) would be the least when they are in their average state—and thus
reflect the true ex ante IRR.19
5.1.3. Classification of Loans. Given the predicted ex-ante profitability, we classify
a loan into a good loan (i.e., a profitable, but harder-to-acquire loan) if ˆIRR is greater
than a threshold level (average interest rate of all loans i.e., 87.5% yearly interest rate)
and a bad loan (i.e., an unprofitable, but easier-to-acquire loan) otherwise. Based on this
classification rule, good loans account for 57% of the loans in the data.20
After classifying each loan into either good or bad type, we aggregate the amount of
acquired or repaid loans by loan type, for each salesperson in each period to create four
outcome variables: the amount of new good loans (NGjt ), that of new bad loans (N
B
jt ), that
of repaid good loans (RGjt) and that of repaid bad loans (R
B
jt).
5.2. Step 1b: Heterogeneous Production Function Estimation
Using the constructed state variables in Step 1a, we estimate the production functions in
equations (1) and (2), which include the salesperson’s effort policy functions. We rewrite










Mω) + εMωjt ,
(8)
18 After we compute ˆIRRi of the 60,970 loans, we match the remaining 39,280 loans, that had some missing predictors,
to one of the 60,970 loans in the model by propensity score matching. The matching is based on loan characteristics
and salesperson characteristics/states, and weighted by the variable importance (reported in online appendix).
19 We assessed sensitivity to the assumption by setting ˜Statej(i) to (i) average compensation states across all sales-
people/loans/periods and (ii) zero. The ex-ante IRR is insenstive to these alterative assumptions, suggesting that
this has little weight in predicting ex ante IRR. More details are in the online appendix.
20 Our results are robust to the loan classification rule. For example, when we based the threshold of good and bad
loans on the branch-level average interest rate, 55% of loans are classified as good.
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where ω ∈ {G,B}. A salesperson with private information (those not in the learning period)
makes the four-dimensional effort choice. However, those within the learning period make
only two-dimensional effort choice for total acquisition and total maintenance. The allo-
cation of efforts across loan types is determined by the population distribution of good
and bad loans. As discussed above, since a multitasking salesperson makes acquisition













where T ∈ {A,M} denotes either acquisition or maintenance and ω ∈ {G,B} denotes loan
type. We allow the effort policy functions to be nonparametric and estimate them with
the random forest method. An alternative way to estimate the policy function is to use
the Chevyshev polynomial approximation as used by the previous papers such as Chung
et al. (2013). In the Chevyshev polynomial approximation method, the researchers need
to choose the number of orders for the basis functions and the set of variables for each of
the basis functions. Given a large number of state variables, it is not straightforward to do
so. By contrast, a benefit of using Random Forest in the first stage is that we do not need
to determine those in an ad-hoc way.
In equation (8), the exogenous shifters Xjt include branch-level average acquisition quota
Q
b
t ; and the interaction between τjt and Q
b
t . The main effect of salesperson tenure τjt is
captured in the effort decision. The salesperson’s average acquisition quota in each branch
captures the market condition, and the interaction with tenure is added to account for
the differential impact of market condition for experienced/inexperienced salespeople.22
We specify f(·) (and h(·)) as a linear function, i.e., f(Xjt;βTω) =X ′jtβTω . Lastly, the four-






jt ) follow a multivariate normal distribution with mean
0 and covariance matrix Σ. We allow shocks to be correlated with one another for the same
salesperson in the same period, but i.i.d across salespeople or across periods.
To semiparametrically estimate equation (8), we use the backfitting algorithm (e.g., Buja
et al. 1989 and Bickel et al. 2005). The key idea is to estimate the additive components
21 We do not explicitly model the limited total time/resource allocated by salesperson j among multiple tasks, because
all salespeople do not spend an equal amount of time at work. Yet, modeling that acquisition and maintenance efforts
affect each other handles account for the effort allocation across tasks.
22 The results are robust to inclusion of period dummies (that can account for potential seasonality) and main effect
of tenure in Xjt. Details are in the online appendix.
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by replacing the conditional
expectation of the partial residuals at each stage. We incorporate salesperson unobserved
heterogeneity through persistent latent segments and estimate heterogeneous policy func-
tions using the EM algorithm developed in Arcidiacono and Miller (2011), and empirically
applied in Chung et al. (2013). A latent segment is denoted by k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} (K is the







and a covariance matrix Σk in this step. More details of the semiparametric estimation
and EM algorithm are provided in the appendix.
Combining Step 1a and Step 1b As Figure 5 describes, we iterate between the loan type
inference step (Step 1a) and the heterogeneous production function estimation step (Step
1b) until convergence. Since loan types and latent segments are both unobserved in the
data, we have to iteratively execute Step 1a and Step 1b, starting from the initial guess
of the latent segment distribution (i.e., 50% for each segment). Given the estimates of the
loan types obtained in Step 1a, we estimate the latent segment distribution in Step 1b. We
iterate on these steps till both the loan type and the salesforce latent segment distribution
converge. The iterative procedure enables us to jointly estimate loan type and salesperson
segment, and to control for salesperson segment Kj(i) in the loan type inference.
5.3. Step 2: Structural Parameter Estimation
In the second step, we estimate the structural parameters Θk, consisting of the parameters
related to the total effort (θk), the acquisition effort for bad loans relative to good loans
(θABk ), the maintenance effort relative to acquisition effort (θ
M
k ), and the maintenance effort
for bad loans relative to good loans (θMBk ) for each salesperson segment k. Our estimation
strategy follows the forward-simulation approach in Bajari et al. (2007). Hence, we first
recover the value function under the optimal policy (the estimated effort policy function),
denoted by V̂ , and then calculate the counterfactual value function under the policies
that deviate from the optimal policy, denote by Ṽ .23 Lastly, the moment inequalities can
be constructed from the difference between two value functions. Segment-level structural
parameters are estimated by the minimum distance estimator of the difference between
Ṽ (s|k; ẽk, β̂k, Σ̂k,φ, Θk) and V̂ (s|k;ek, β̂k, Σ̂k,φ, Θk) for each segment:





V̂ (s|k;ek,βk, Σk,φ, Θk)− Ṽ (s|k; ẽk,βk, Σk,φ, Θk), 0
}]2
,
23 The reported results are based on adding a random normal shock with a standard deviation of 0.01 to the optimal
strategy. They remain robust to deviations of random normal shocks with a standard deviation of 0.1. We forward-
simulate over 14 periods and average over 100 simulations to calculate V̂ . More details are in the online appendix.
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where ek is the estimated optimal policy and ẽk is the deviated policy.
Following Bajari et al. (2007), we estimate standard errors based on 500 randomly
selected bootstrapped samples. To take into account the estimation error in the first stage,
we estimate both the first stage and the second stage for each bootstrapped sample. How-
ever, since we use the Random Forest algorithm in the first stage policy estimation, this
simple bootstrapping may not be enough to correctly estimate standard errors. Although
there are a few recent papers that show how to correct standard errors in two-step esti-
mation such as Chernozhukov et al. (2019) and Chernozhukov et al. (2018b), it is still
unclear about how to adapt these methods to complicated dynamic structural models
with continuous choice variables like ours. Hence, our standard errors estimates may be
biased to the extent of the necessary adjustments developed in these recent papers. In the
online appendix, we conduct a sensitivity analysis on this issue by changing the degree of
perturbation.
5.4. Identification
We now discuss the identification of the multitasking model with private information.
It is useful to begin with the dynamic structural models for single task salesforces with
unidimensional incentives (e.g., Misra and Nair 2011, Chung et al. 2013) and assess how
we handle identification challenges arising from the new features (i) multitasking with
multidimensional incentives and (ii) private information. For ease of exposition, we begin
with the extension to multitasking with multidimensional incentives, ignoring the issue of
private information. Then we discuss the additional identification issues related to private
information.
5.4.1. Multitasking with multidimensional incentives. It is critical for the identifica-
tion of the multitasking model to observe performance outcomes related to each task or
each dimension that is incentivized. Beyond that, most of the identification assumptions
for the multitasking model follow the single task papers. First, the assumptions are about
the links between effort and outcomes. To the extent that we observe acquisition outcomes
and retention outcomes (linked to the two tasks), we assume (i) outcomes are a strictly
monotonic function of each effort; (ii) outcomes are an additively separable function of
production shifters, effort, and production shocks; and (iii) since effort is not observed, the
multiplier effect of effort on the outcome is normalized to 1.
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The fourth assumption that is needed for the identification of e(·), f(·), and h(·), is the
orthogonality condition for the error, i.e., E[ε|S,X] = 0, where S is the vector of the sales-
people’s state variables, and X is the vector of exogenous demand shifters. Behaviorally,
this implies that the effort function e(S) is a deterministic function of S, and f(·) and h(·)
are deterministic functions of Xjt. In other words, there’s no unobserved heterogeneity in
outcomes conditional on the state variables (including the latent class of salespeople) and
the exogenous shifters. In addition, the multitasking model requires us to identify covari-
ance in multitask outcomes. The covariance in outcomes Njt and Rjt conditional on states
Sjt and exogenous shifters Xjt allows us to identify the covariance of shocks Σ.
The structural parameters in the effort cost function, Θ, are identified from the intertem-
poral linkage of states, efforts, and outcomes. More specifically, given the outcome func-
tions identified and our assumption on the utility function from the bonus, the optimality
condition of the salesperson’s efforts choice problem pins down the effort cost parameters.
As in Chung et al. (2013), the identification of unobserved finite mixture heterogeneity
follows Kasahara and Shimotsu (2009), which show that at least three periods of panel
data is necessary for the identification. We note that unlike their discrete choice model,
ours is a continuous choice model. However, our loan-officer panel data is significantly
longer (than three periods) and therefore, would be sufficient for identification.
Thus to summarize, the identification requirements for extending single-task models to
the multitask model with multidimensional incentives are straightforward. The model is
identified if we have a performance metric for each task or performance dimension.
5.4.2. Private Information. Next, we consider the identification of the model with
private information. In our setting, the salesperson’s private information is the knowledge
of which loans are good or bad conditional on observables so that the salesperson can
optimally exert the right level of effort on good and bad loans. Identification of the model
with private information is achieved by the ability to infer the type of loans from the
ex-post realization of loan repayment, i.e., the ex-post IRR of the loan is necessary for
us to classify the good and bad loans. Given this information (similar to the arguments
for the model without private information), researchers can infer what effort was made
on not just acquisition and maintenance in each period, but also on good and bad loans
in each period. And as such, it is possible to identify all the structural parameters of the
model—the cost of effort in acquiring and maintaining good and bad loans.
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Note that the above identification argument did not place any role for transfers that we
observe in the data. We now clarify the role of transfers in estimating the model. Without
transfers, all periods in the data have private information. However, with transfers, there
is a learning period in which salespeople do not have private information. In the learning
period, we make the structural assumption that salespeople cannot allocate effort based
on loan type—they simply decide on how much effort to allocate to acquisition and main-
tenance, and the effort on good and bad loans are allocated based on the distribution of
loan types in the population. Indeed, as we report in Table A2 in the appendix, sales-
person behavior in the learning period is different from the other periods. Thus modeling
behavior after transfer involves only a structural assumption —there are no new structural
parameters to estimate. Hence while transfers provide over-identifying restrictions in the
model, they are not necessary for the identification of the structural parameters.
6. Results
We first report the results of the first stage estimation of loan officer production functions.
Then, we report the second stage estimates of the parameters of the structural model. In
Online Appendix ??, we report the fit of the model.
6.1. First Stage Estimates: Loan officer production functions
In the first stage, we allow discrete latent segments in the loan officer production functions,
and find that a two-segment model—one with a segment share of 68% and other with
32%, best fits the data based on the BIC criterion. We then estimate the loan production
functions for each segment and report the estimates of the exogenous production shifters
for each type of outcomes by segment in Table 5. The first two panels show the impact of
exogenous shifters on acquisition performance for good loans and bad loans, respectively.
Not surprisingly, acquisitions are greater in branches with higher quotas, reflecting their
greater market size. Interestingly, experience (tenure) helps with the acquisition of bad
loans, while hurting the acquisition of good loans. The bottom two panels of the table
present the estimates for maintenance performance functions for good and bad loans,
respectively. The results imply that as the average acquisition quota increases, repayment
performance deteriorates. This is understandable as salespeople must exert more effort in
loan acquisition when there are larger quotas and thus focus less on loan collection. As
expected, experience helps salespeople to improve maintenance.
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Table 5 Loan Officer Outcome Functions: Demand Shifters
Segment 1 Segment 2
Segment Share 68 % 32 %
Acquisition of Good Loans
Average Quota (branch) 44.68 (0.170) 38.15 (0.096)
Tenure * Average Quota (branch) -10.44 (0.040) -9.27 (0.022)
Intercept -6.81 (0.033) -6.92 (0.033)
Acquisition of Bad Loans
Average Quota (branch) 11.94 (0.053) 9.38 (0.042)
Tenure * Average Quota (branch) 4.32 (0.016) 4.91 (0.014)
Intercept -8.55 (0.036) -6.22 (0.031)
Maintenance of Good Loans
Average Quota (branch) -1.28 (0.004) -0.45 (0.011)
Tenure * Average Quota (branch) 1.44 (0.005) 1.17 (0.004)
Intercept -1.78 (0.007) -1.57 (0.005)
Maintenance of Bad Loans
Average Quota (branch) -33.04 (0.138) -33.21 (0.071)
Tenure * Average Quota (branch) 0.92 (0.004) 0.95 (0.003)
Intercept 3.07 (0.013) 3.07 (0.008)
Note: Standard errors are in the parentheses.
Next, we report some illustrative features of the high-dimensional nonparametric acqui-
sition and maintenance effort policy functions. Figure 6 shows the four types of effort by
segment against the fraction of unpaid loans in period t− 1–a proxy of the quality of the
loan portfolio of the officer—a relevant state variable. Note that the higher the fraction of
unpaid loans, the lower the quality of the current loan portfolio, and the more difficult it
is to perform well on the maintenance metric. The first and second subplots in Figure 6
show the total acquisition effort on good and bad loans, respectively, while the third and
fourth subplots show the corresponding total maintenance effort.24
A few aspects stand out from the plots. First, Segment 2 loan officers expend more effort
on good loans relative to Segment 1, whereas Segment 1 expends more effort than Segment
2 on bad loans. This suggests that the moral hazard issues are greater with Segment 1 than
with Segment 2. Second, both segments exert more acquisition effort when the quality of
the loan portfolio is good; but they reduce acquisition effort and increase maintenance effort
when the portfolio quality is bad, as seen in the maintenance plots. Third, the maintenance
effort on bad loans increases when the fraction of unpaid loans is higher than 0.1. This
reflects the highly nonlinear compensation schedule, where the maintenance index (M)
24 We emphasize this is the total effort. Effort per capita on loans is always lower on bad loans than on good loans.
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Figure 6 Effort Policy by Segment depending on Fraction of Unpaid Loans in the Previous Period
(a) Effort to Acquire Good Loans (b) Effort to Acquire Bad Loans
(c) Effort to Maintain Good Loans (d) Effort to Maintain Bad Loans
drops sharply to zero at approximately 12.5%; incentivizing salespeople to redirect more
effort more to maintenance.
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6.2. Cost Parameter Estimates
Table 6 reports the estimates of the structural parameters in the effort cost functions.25
As indicated by the higher θCk , Segment 2 has greater disutility for effort than Segment 1;
thus, Segment 1 is overall more productive. The estimate θABk , shows that for Segment 1,
the acquisition effort for bad loans is only about 15% of the acquisition effort for a good
loan. This is in contrast to Segment 2, for whom the relative cost for acquiring a bad
loan is around 97% of that for the good loan. Thus, although Segment 1 is overall more
productive, there is also a greater danger of moral hazard from Segment 1 in using private
information to acquire more bad loans.
In terms of the maintenance cost, the estimate of θMk shows that Segment 1’s cost of
maintenance effort is about the same as that for acquisition. Also, from θMBk , we see the
cost of maintaining bad loans and good loans are roughly equal. In contrast, Segment 2
find the cost of maintenance of good loans only 30% of the cost of acquisition, but find
the cost of maintenance of bad loans three times more difficult. Thus overall, Segment 2
is less likely to acquire bad loans and is also more effective in collecting the good loans it
acquires. However, given its high overall cost, it will acquire overall fewer loans.
Based on these estimates, we label Segment 1 as the “hunter” segment and Segment 2
as the “farmer” segment. The hunter segment is not only relatively good at acquiring new
customers, but also likely to acquire more bad customers. The “farmer” segment has a
comparative advantage in collecting past loans (especially good loans), but also less likely
to acquire bad loans.26
6.2.1. Private Information and Structural Cost Parameter Estimates. Before we
move on to counterfactuals, we briefly consider how not accounting for private information
can bias the structural cost parameter estimates. Table 7 reports three sets of structural
cost parameter estimates for the two salesperson segments. The first column (i) simply
replicates the estimates from Table 6 for comparison. The second column (ii) reports the
estimates with only non-learning periods, where private information is always present. The
25 We check the sensitivity of results in the online appendix using a different specification in which there are four
independent parameters for costs of acquisition and maintenance for good and bad loans. While the estimates remain
qualitatively the same, we retain the current specification because it is easier to interpret the results (e.g., comparative
advantage of each segment between two tasks).
26 In the Online Appendix, we verify performance heterogeneity across segments in terms of average acquisition and
maintenance indices. Salespeople classified as hunters outperform farmers on average in the acquisition task, while
farmers outperform hunters in the maintenance task.
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Total Cost (θCk ) 1.970 (0.016) 3.322 (0.025)
Relative Acquisition Cost of Bad Loans (θABk ) 0.146 (0.014) 0.965 (0.065)
Relative Cost of Maintenance Effort (θMk ) 1.063 (0.008) 0.303 (0.037)
Relative Maintenance Cost of Bad Loans (θMBk ) 0.964 (0.138) 2.968 (0.890)



















third column (iii), reports the estimates with all periods, but do not account for the fact
that salespeople have no private information during learning periods.
The estimates from columns (i) and (ii) are very similar, supporting our identification
argument that the model can be identified entirely from non-learning periods, and learning
periods merely provide overidentifying restrictions. Comparing columns (i) and (iii), we
see that not accounting for the fact that salespeople do not have private information in
the learning periods, significantly biases the structural estimates.
The signs of the bias from not accounting for the absence of private information is pre-
dictable. If the model assumes that salespeople can distinguish loan types during learning
periods (i.e., right after transfer): (a) total cost (θCk ) is underestimated because salespeople
with private information exert more effort in acquisition and maintenance overall because
the effort is more effective with private information; (b) relative acquisition cost of bad
loans (θABk ) is underestimated as private information induces salespeople to acquire more
bad loans; (c) relative cost of maintenance effort (θMk ) is overestimated for Hunters, who
would focus on acquiring new loans with private information, but underestimated for Farm-
ers, who would specialize in maintenance task; and (d) relative maintenance cost of bad
loans (θMBk ) is overestimated because private information induces salespeople to selectively
collect good loans.
7. Counterfactual Simulations
We examine the main research questions through three counterfactual policy simulations.
The first counterfactual investigates how to combine performance metrics across multi-
ple tasks in determining compensation. Specifically, we evaluate whether performance on
acquisition and maintenance tasks should be combined multiplicatively or additively. The
second counterfactual investigates the question of job design by comparing outcomes under
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(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
Share 68% 67% 64% 32% 33% 36%
Total Cost (θCk ) 1.970 1.924 1.224 3.322 3.207 2.551
Relative Acquisition Cost of Bad Loans (θABk ) 0.146 0.190 0.089 0.965 0.998 0.723
Relative Cost of Maintenance Effort (θMk ) 1.063 1.151 1.451 0.303 0.375 0.074
Relative Maintenance Cost of Bad Loans (θMBk ) 0.964 0.977 1.677 2.968 2.814 4.469



















(i): Table 6, (ii): Non-learning periods only, (iii): Learning periods treated as having private information
a multitasking and specialization job design. Under multitasking, salespeople are respon-
sible for both loan acquisition and maintenance tasks, while under specialization, each
salesperson is responsible for either loan acquisition or maintenance. To highlight the trade-
off between efficiency and incentive alignment, in the first two counterfactuals, we consider
the case where the salesperson has private information. The last counterfactual investi-
gates the effect of transfers on performance through their impact on salesperson private
information.
For each counterfactual outcome, we resolve the salesperson’s dynamic optimization
problem for each segment (“hunter” or “farmer”), fixing the salesperson’s characteristics at
their mean. Also, we do not rely on the first-order conditions in solving for optimal salesper-
son effort, but use a numerical approach that does not require derivatives (Nelder-Mead)
because the maintenance index function is not differentiable everywhere. We consider mul-
tiple starting points to ensure that the optimization algorithm converges to the global
maximum.
7.1. Multidimensional Incentive Plan Design
We first explore how to aggregate performance metrics across multiple tasks for bonus.
In particular, we compare the multiplicative aggregation approach used by the firm, i.e.,
Bonus =A×M against the more widely used additive aggregation. While there are more
general compensation schemes than what we consider, our main purpose here is examining
the nuanced effects of multiplicative incentive schemes rather than deriving the optimal
contract.27 We consider the following additive aggregation Bonus = wA+ (2−w)M and
27 We consider an alternative scheme where hunters and farmers specialize in the acquisition and maintenance tasks
respectively, and hunters’ incentives are based on A×M . The details are presented in the appendix. Overall, we leave
the full characterization of the optimal incentive scheme design for future research.
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(b) Profit (1000 Pesos)
find the optimal w to maximize the firm’s profits, i.e., NPV of loans net incentive payout.
Using a grid search over w ∈ {0.25, 0.5, ..., 1.75}, we find w= 0.5 is optimal. In Table 8, we
report the result for Bonus= 0.5A+ 1.5M .
Table 8 Profit: Multiplicative versus Additive
Incentive Design Multiplicative (Bonus=A×M) Additive (Bonus= 0.5A+ 1.5M)
Hunter Farmer Aggregate Hunter Farmer Aggregate
Acquisition - Good 93.1 98.3 94.8 93.8 109.1 98.7
Acquisition - Bad 196.8 102.9 166.8 208.6 115 178.6
Maintenance - Good 79.5 81.6 80.2 79.6 92.8 83.8
Maintenance - Bad 115.4 78.8 103.7 104 93.4 100.6
Net Present Value (NPV) 470.6 424.7 455.9 414 502.5 442.3
Incentive Payout 63.8 66.0 63.8 63.6 68.0 65.0
Profit (NPV - Payout) 406.8 358.7 392.1 350.4 434.4 377.3
1) Aggregate measures take account of share of hunters (68%) and that of farmers (32%) in the setting.
2) All values are in 1,000 pesos.
3) NPV is based on monthly interest rate of 1%.
First, we find that under additive aggregation, the hunter segment acquires 6% more bad
loans, and repayment is 6% lower. Thus, hunters expend more effort on the loan acquisition
task on which they have a comparative advantage relative to loan collection. This leads to
the total NPV of the hunters’ loans going down by 12% and the profitability minus the
incentive payout going down by 13.8%. In Figure 7, we visually present the key results
in terms of the repayment probability and profit of the loans acquired and collected by
each segment of salespeople. For hunters, the repayment probability and the total profit
are higher under the multiplicative aggregation. This is consistent with the insight from
MacDonald and Marx (2001) that the payoff complementarity induced by multiplicative
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aggregation can mitigate adverse specialization. The results are, however, reversed for
farmers; repayment probability and NPV are higher with additive aggregation, as shown
in Figure 7. The acquisition performance is 11.4% higher; further, loan collection is 14.5%
higher as well. Thus, the NPV of the loans goes up by 18.3%, and the total profit after
considering the incentive payout is 21.1% higher.
Given the natural intertemporal production and payoff complementarity—acquiring bad
loans will hurt salesperson (and firm) future payoff, there is alignment in payoffs for firms
and salespeople even under additive aggregation. By sharpening the contemporaneous
payoff complementarity across tasks through multiplicative aggregation, the farmers end
up shifting more of their effort to the acquisition tasks at which they are inefficient, overall
reducing their productivity and profitability to the firm. However, despite the negative
effect on farmers, the overall effect of multiplicative aggregation is to improve firm profits
because hunters account for a greater proportion of the salesforce at the firm.
7.2. Job Design and Task Allocation
In our second counterfactual analysis, we examine a largely unexplored question in the
salesforce literature related to job design: how to allocate different tasks across salespeople
whose capabilities are heterogeneous? For the purposes of this counterfactual, we consider
two polar cases of specialization and multitasking. A natural assignment of tasks under the
specialization design is to assign the acquisition task to “hunters,” who are more effective at
acquisition, and the maintenance task to “farmers,” who are more effective at maintenance.
By contrast, both segments are responsible for both acquisition and maintenance tasks
under the multitasking case.
For multitasking, we use the same compensation plan used by the firm. For specialization,


























t +h(Xt;βω) + ε
Mω
t (ω ∈ {G,B}),

















28 We restrict the incentive plan to be a linear function of acquisition and maintenance performance and search for
the optimal parameters of the incentive plan using grid search. In the online appendix, we report the profits under
different values of kA and kM .
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where Πt is the profits for the bank, C
H(·) is the estimated effort cost function for the
hunter segment and CF (·) is the one for the farmer segment. Note that eA = {eAt }∞t=1, eM =








t }. Solving the optimization problem,
we find that the optimal linear compensation are kA∗ = 0.5 and kM∗ = 0.75.
Table 9 reports the acquisition and maintenance performance on each type of loan and
overall firm profits (Net Present Value - incentive payout to salespeople) under the mul-
titasking and specialization design, respectively. Figure 8 reports three measures of loan
performance under the two types of job design. Table 9 shows that hunters acquire more
loans, but particularly more bad loans under the specialization scheme than under the
multitasking. Similarly, farmers maintain more good loans under the specialization and
only slightly fewer bad loans. These findings confirm the overall efficiency gain of the
specialization design.
However, these efficiency gains are more than overwhelmed by moral hazard. Figure 8a
shows that hunters acquire significantly more bad loans under the specialization and the
repayment probability is significantly lower as farmers are not good at collecting the bad
loans (see Figure 8b). Overall, this leads to a 35% lower profit under specialization (see
Figure 8c).
We elaborate further on how specialization hurts the firm, despite the efficiency gain in
both segments. First, since hunters do not internalize the future consequences of acquiring
bad loans, they exploit private information much more under specialization and acquire
more bad loans than they do under the multitasking scheme. Second, since farmers are
good at collecting good loans, but not good at collecting bad loans, most of the bad loans
acquired by hunters end up being delinquent. Together, profitability is significantly lower
under the specialization scheme.
While in this analysis, we have focused on the polar cases of specialization and multi-
tasking to generate insights into the trade-off between efficiency and incentive alignment,
we note that other variations in task allocation and compensation plans are feasible. For
example, one could create a team structure, where performance is measured at the team
level, but team members have specialized tasks. Although we consider a few alternative
job allocation/incentive schemes in the appendix, we leave the full problem of optimal job
design along all of these dimensions for future research.
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Table 9 Profitability: Multitasking versus Specialization
Job Design Multitasking Specialization
Hunter Farmer Aggregate Hunter Farmer Aggregate
Acquisition - Good 93.1 98.3 94.8 135.1 135.1
Acquisition - Bad 196.8 102.9 166.8 300.9 300.9
Maintenance - Good 79.5 81.6 80.2 95.9 95.9
Maintenance - Bad 115.4 78.8 103.7 111.3 111.3
Net Present Value (NPV) 470.6 424.7 455.9 372.7
Incentive Payout 63.8 66.0 63.8 80.4
Profit (NPV - Payout) 406.8 358.7 392.1 292.3
1) Multitasking Incentive Plan: Bonus=A×M
2) Specialization Incentive Plan: Bonus= 0.5A for Hunter and Bonus= 0.75M for Farmer
3) Aggregate measures take account of share of hunters (68%) and that of farmers (32%) in the setting.
4) All values are in 1,000 pesos.
5) NPV is based on monthly interest rate of 1%.





































(c) Profit (1000 Pesos)
7.3. Job Transfers and Private Information
Our final counterfactual examines the role of the transfer policy in eliminating private infor-
mation and how the policy affects the firm’s profits. This is an interesting counterfactual
because our estimation results imply that private information can be a double-edged sword
by helping salespeople acquire less risky loans and making better maintenance decisions
while leading to salesperson moral hazard.
To quantify the effects of private information, we simulate salesperson behavior using
the estimated policy function when salespeople have private information (i.e., when they
are not transferred) and the estimated policy function when they do not have private
information (i.e., when they are transferred with 100% probability). Table 10 and Figure
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Figure 9 Loan Performance: Without versus With Private Information






























(c) Profit (1000 Pesos)
9 describe salesperson performance and profitability under two cases. With private infor-
mation, we find hunters abuse their knowledge to acquire more bad loans by 8.8% (Figure
9a), which are repaid less by 13.7% (Figure 9b), and generate lower profit by 3% (Figure
9c). By contrast, farmers take advantage of private information to be involved in fewer
new bad loans by 5.2% (Figure 9a), selectively monitor and better collect loans by 2.8%
(Figure 9b), and generate higher profit by 2% (Figure 9c). Overall, our simulation results
suggest that the firm can improve profits by transferring hunters more frequently than
farmers, instead of the current random policy, where all salespeople are equally likely to
be transferred.
Table 10 Profitability: Without versus With Private Information
Without Private Information With Private Information
Hunter Farmer Aggregate Hunter Farmer Aggregate
Acquisition - Good 93.1 98.3 94.8 85.4 94.8 88.4
Acquisition - Bad 196.8 102.9 166.8 123.5 122.3 123.1
Maintenance - Good 79.5 81.6 80.2 79.3 79.2 79.3
Maintenance - Bad 115.4 78.8 103.7 89.7 87.8 89.1
Net Present Value (NPV) 470.6 424.7 455.9 450.5 434.5 445.4
Incentive Payout 63.2 65.9 63.8 55.5 68.5 59.7
Profit (NPV - Payout) 407.4 358.7 392.1 395.0 366.0 385.7
1) Aggregate measures take account of share of hunters (68%) and that of farmers (32%) in the setting.
2) All values are in 1,000 pesos.
3) NPV is based on monthly interest rate of 1%.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we broaden the focus of empirical research in salesforce management, which
was primarily focused on single task settings with unidimensional incentives to multitasking
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settings with multidimensional incentives, where salespeople also have private information
about customers. This allowed us to expand the substantive focus in salesforce manage-
ment to questions of performance aggregation across tasks, job design, and management
of private information.
To this end, we developed a new dynamic structural model of multitasking with multi-
dimensional incentives, where there is an intertemporal tradeoff in effort allocated across
tasks. Differences in marginal cost of effort on the different dimensions among salespeople
can lead to misaligned allocation of effort from the firm’s perspective, with more effort allo-
cated to the task where the reward-cost tradeoff is more favorable—adverse specialization.
Further, the model allows for salesperson moral hazard by allowing them to have private
information about customers. The private information further misaligns effort, by redirect-
ing effort toward customers who the salesperson knows to be less valuable to the firm, but
easier to obtain incentives for the salesperson. Our identification and estimation strategies
address various challenges involved in such a multitasking model with private informa-
tion. We apply our model and estimation methods in a rich empirical microfinance setting.
Finally, using the estimates of our structural model, we conduct counterfactual analysis
on managerially relevant questions on multidimensional incentive design, job design, and
task allocation for salespeople in the presence of complementarities between tasks, and job
transfers that impact private information.
Given the widespread prevalence of multitasking, multidimensional incentives, and
employee private information, our structural model can potentially serve as a workhorse
model in many settings across the fields of marketing, operations management, organiza-
tional behavior, and organizational economics. Special cases (or minor adaptations) of the
model can be used in settings without dynamics when tasks have no intertemporal linkages
and those without private information. The model can be even applied to single task set-
tings with multidimensional incentives. For example, consider a customer support person,
with incentives based on composite performance metrics such as customer satisfaction and
average time per call. Even though there is only a single task of providing service, the
person needs to balance effort on the satisfaction and service time dimensions to maximize
incentives.
While the paper expanded the range of issues that can be addressed through structural
modeling in salesforce management, there remain issues that we abstracted away or did
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not account for due to a lack of relevance for our empirical application. These are poten-
tially fertile areas of study for future research. First, while we considered the extreme cases
of specialization and multitasking, we abstracted away from other potential job designs,
including team-based incentives where different members are responsible for different tasks.
There could also be settings where incentive alignment might be created through mar-
kets for acquired assets. Second, we treated issues of optimizing each component of the
compensation plan, such as how to set acquisition quotas or the functional form linking
maintenance performance to incentives, as beyond the scope of this paper. Third, while our
application is for loan officers in the banking sector and there are parallels with customer
acquisition and retention tasks in customer relationship management settings, it would
be useful to consider an explicit application in a CRM setting. In such settings, customer
maintenance tasks can have multiple components involving customer growth and reten-
tion. Finally, Holmström and Milgrom (1991) discuss the accuracy and measurability of
performance metrics as critical in job and incentive design. It would be useful to consider
multiple tasks where the accuracy of measurement might differ across tasks (e.g., sales is
more precisely measured than customer satisfaction) and how these differences impact job
and incentive design.
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Appendix
A. Compensation Plan
Maintenance index of salesperson j in period t (Mjt) is a function of maintenance performance (i.e., the
amount of repaid loans, relative to that of loans due in period t (Rjt/Ojt)). Table A1 describes how the
maintenance index depends on the share of loan amount in good standing in each period.
Table A1 Maintenance Index
% of loan amount
in good standing
Index
% of loan amount
in good standing
Index
% of loan amount
in good standing
Index
0 - 87.5% 0 93 - 93.5% 0.75 96.5 - 97% 1.05
87.5 - 88.5% 0.5 93.5 - 94% 0.8 97 – 97.5% 1.08
88.5 - 90% 0.6 94 - 94.5% 0.85 97.5 - 98% 1.1
90 - 92.5% 0.65 94.5 - 96% 0.9 98 - 99% 1.15
92.5 -93% 0.7 96 - 96.5% 1 99 - 99.5% 1.2
99.5 - 100% 1.25
B. Learning Period for Salesperson Private Information
To assess whether the absence of private information impacts effort allocation, we test whether the IRR
of loans acquired and the probability of loan delinquency differ (conditional on credit rating) during the
learning period relative to other periods. To empirically assess the appropriate length of the learning period,
we use different lengths of learning periods (1,2... months) in the regressions.
Table A2 presents the regression results. The DV in the first two columns is the acquired loans’ IRR; for the
last two columns, it is the delinquency probability of loans. The independent variable (Private Information)
denotes a dummy variable for the learning period (1 or 2 months as noted in each column). Since IRR and
delinquency are impacted by credit ratings, we include both the main effect of credit rating and interaction
terms with private information.
From Column (1), we find that for the one month learning period, officers with private information acquire
significantly lower quality loans than those without, except for credit rating 2 loans, while from Column (2),
the negative effect disappears for the two month learning period. This finding suggests that it takes about
a month for salespeople to learn loan types for acquisition. Similarly, from Column (3), we find that the
delinquency probability of loans is higher for credit ratings 3, 4 and 5, (these account for most loans) for the
one-month learning period, while the effects are insignificant for the two-month learning period. This again
suggests that it is reasonable to assume that the length of the learning period for loan maintenance is about
one month.
C. Estimation of Production Function
C.1. Backfitting Algorithm
To estimate the semi-parametric salesperson production function, we apply the backfitting algorithm (Buja
et al. 1989 and Bickel et al. 2005):
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Table A2 Assumption on Salesperson Learning Period of Private Information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV
Acquisition Acquisition Maintenance Maintenance
IRR IRR Pr(Delinquent) PR(Delinquent)
Learning period 1 month 2 months 1 month 2 months
Private Info -3.812*** -1.417 0.00297 -0.0107
(1.112) (1.064) (0.0123) (0.0118)
Private Info * Rating 2 3.988** 5.145*** 0.0392* 0.0147
(1.834) (1.730) (0.0202) (0.0192)
Private Info * Rating 3 -2.034 -0.178 -0.0329** -0.0133
(1.472) (1.422) (0.0162) (0.0158)
Private Info * Rating 4 -1.806 -0.0819 -0.0668*** -0.0116
(1.225) (1.178) (0.0135) (0.0131)
Private Info * Rating 5 -2.525** 0.637 -0.0887*** -0.00555
(1.140) (1.095) (0.0126) (0.0122)
Rating 2 6.864*** 8.059*** -0.0844*** -0.0706***
(0.685) (0.727) (0.0188) (0.0175)
Rating 3 21.43*** 23.72*** -0.189*** -0.223***
(0.550) (0.587) (0.0151) (0.0144)
Rating 4 33.63*** 36.55*** -0.387*** -0.466***
(0.468) (0.502) (0.0125) (0.0119)
Rating 5 42.00*** 45.31*** -0.486*** -0.600***
(0.441) (0.475) (0.0116) (0.0110)
Intercept 46.11*** 43.54*** 0.717*** 0.748***
(0.432) (0.465) (0.0113) (0.0106)
N 100,250 90,986 100,250 90,986
R-sq 0.154 0.175 0.238 0.265
1. Initialize β̂AG , β̂AB , β̂MG , β̂MB and Σ̂.




NGjt − f(Xjt; β̂AG)
NBjt − f(Xjt; β̂AB )
RGjt− f(Xjt; β̂MG)













3. Predict êAGjt (Sjt; λ̂
AG), êABjt (Sjt; λ̂
AB ), êMGjt (Sjt; λ̂
MG) and êMBjt (Sjt; λ̂
MB ), based on the estimates of λ̂AG ,
λ̂AB , λ̂MG and λ̂MB .







which follow a Multinomial Normal distribution.
(β̂AG , β̂AB , β̂MG , β̂MB , Σ̂) = arg maxL


NGjt − f̂(Xjt)− ê
AG
jt (Sjt)
















logφ(εjt) with the density function of the
Multinomial Normal distribution.
5. Iterate 2− 4 until convergence.
In Step 2, we make use of a machine learning approach to allow for flexible effort policy functions, where
NGjt − f̂(Xjt) is the outcome for prediction and Sjt is the explanatory variables. Note that the left-hand
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side variables are all scalar variables given β’s. It is important not to make a restrictive assumption on the
functional form, which might lead to biased structural parameter estimates. Specifically, we use the random
forest algorithm due to its high predictive power and flexibility for the nonparametric estimation. Moreover,
we combine the algorithm with cross-sample fitting to eliminate overfitting and ensure the consistency of the
estimator under a high-dimensional effort function (Chernozhukov et al. 2018a), motivated by Newey and
Powell (2003). To do so, we randomly divide the observations into the main and auxiliary samples, each of
which takes up 50% of the data; we obtain the estimates only from the main sample only and those from
the auxiliary sample only, and we then average the results across the samples.
C.2. Incorporating unobserved heterogeneity
We incorporate the unobserved latent segments of salespeople by the method developed by Arcidiacono
and Jones (2003). Following the application in Chung et al. (2013) that use the same method for the uni-
dimensional effort policy function, we compute the log-likelihood of simultaneously observing salesperson j’s






jt) given segment-level parameters and the persistent










where L(·) is the log-likelihood defined in step 4 of the backfitting algorithm described in the previous
step (with a little abuse of notation). The full-information log-likelihood, weighted by the probability of


















and pk is the fraction of segment k.
The EM algorithm is described as follows for the (m+ 1)-th iteration:
1. Compute q
(m+1)
jk using equation (11) with e
(m),β(m), Σ(m) and p(m).
2. Obtain e(m+1),β(m+1) and Σ(m+1) by maximizing the full information maximum likelihood, weighted
by q
(m+1)
jk in equation (10).
3. Update p(m+1) by taking the average of q
(m+1)
jk .
We iterate step 1− 3 until convergence. The initial values are estimates of e,β and Σ without unobserved
heterogeneity, and random size p that sums up to 1.
D. Additional Counterfactual Simulations
D.1. Specialization Job Design, but Incentives Linked to Acquisition and Repayment
Outcomes
In this section, we consider an alternative incentive design under the specialization job allocation. In the
main text, each salesperson is assigned to only one task, and her bonus is based on the performance of the
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assigned task. An alternative incentive under the specialization scheme is an incentive contract where the
hunter is evaluated based on both acquisition and maintenance performances. This incentive scheme could
help solve the incentive misalignment issue of the specialization job design that we consider in the main text,
where the issue is that the hunter does not care about the future profitability of newly-acquired loans.
We simulate specialized salespeople’s behaviors under the compensation plan that rewards hunters’ efforts
to acquire good loans in Table A3. Following Table 9, we choose the incentive plan to be Bonus= 0.5A for
hunters and Bonus= 0.75M for farmers, when specialized hunters are rewarded in terms of acquisition per-
formance only. When hunters are incentivized based on both acquisition and maintenance performances, their
incentive plan is chosen to be Bonus=A×M , whereas farmers’ incentive plan remains as Bonus= 0.75M .
Farmers are not evaluated in terms of hunters’ acquisition performances in any case because acquisition
outcomes are realized before their maintenance effort and beyond farmers’ control at all.
Table A3 shows the acquisition and maintenance performance of good and bad loans; Net Present Value
(NPV) of loans and incentive payout; and the firm’s profit under two incentive designs for specialized
salespeople. We find that the profit increases by 33% if hunters’ incentive depends not only on acquisition
performance but also on maintenance performance. This happens because hunters now care about the quality
of acquired loans and hence do not acquire too many bad loans.
Table A3 Profitability: Hunters incentivized on Acquisition only versus Hunters incentivized on Acquisition and
Maintenance
Hunters’ Incentive Design Bonus= 0.5A Bonus=A ∗M
Hunter Farmer Aggregate Hunter Farmer Aggregate
Acquisition - Good 135.1 135.1 120.5 120.5
Acquisition - Bad 300.9 300.9 236.2 236.2
Maintenance - Good 95.9 95.9 113.7 113.7
Maintenance - Bad 111.3 111.3 96.8 96.8
Net Present Value (NPV) 372.7 464.7
Incentive Payout 80.4 76.9
Profit (NPV - Payout) 292.3 387.8
1) Farmers’ incentive is Bonus= 0.75M in both cases.
2) Aggregate measures take account of share of hunters (68%) and that of farmers (32%) in the setting.
3) All values are in 1,000 pesos.
4) NPV is based on monthly interest rate of 1%.
Although this incentive scheme seems more profitable, our interview with the firm tells us that it is not
feasible to implement it. The firm’s main concern lies in the perceived unfairness across salespeople because
hunters would not accept that their bonus partly depends on farmers’ performances. For example, a loan
default is attributed not only to ex ante low quality of loans, which a hunter is responsible for, but also
a lack of maintenance effort by a farmer. Thus, a hunter cannot be penalized by loan defaults when he’s
only in charge of loan acquisition. Furthermore, the random transfer policy is another obstacle to justify
the incentive scheme. Right after transfers, farmers are not capable of collecting loans well. It is hard to
convince hunters that their compensation partly depends on whether their new loans are maintained by
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transferred farmers or not. Despite the difficulty of implementing the incentive scheme in practice, we believe
the simulation sheds light on the way to address the incentive misalignment problem.
D.2. Multitasking Job Design with Loan Repayment Only based Incentive
As an alternative incentive under the multitasking job design, we consider the bonus based on the repayment
amount instead of the multiplicative incentive. Although our main results show that the multiplicative
incentive help mitigate the incentive misalignment between the firm and salespeople, there is still a gap
between the firm’s and salesperson’s incentives due to different performance metrics they are interested in.
That is because the firm wants to maximize the total profit as a function of the amount of loan repayment,
while the salesperson attempts to jointly maximize the amount of loan acquisition and the fraction of loan
repayment. Thus, the bonus incentive based on the loan repayment amount would be of interest to the bank.
Note that the loan amount based incentive is still a multidimensional incentive scheme as the bonus depends
on both the acquired amount and repayment probability.
To do so, we simulate a salesperson’s behavior under the compensation plan based on the amount of
loan repayment. The incentive plan is chosen to be Bonus=RepayAmt/(4∗Quota), which normalizes total
repayment amount by the acquisition quota for the average duration of loans (4 months) to compensate
salespeople based on repayment amount of loans per targeted acquisition amount. Like other counterfactual
simulations in Section 7, a salesperson is assumed to have private information about customers in every
period and is not affected by the transfer policy.
Table A4 compares the acquisition and maintenance performance of good and bad loans; Net Present
Value (NPV) of loans and incentive payout; and the firm’s profit from two segments of salespeople under the
two incentive plans. The profit considering Net Present Value of loans and incentive payout increases by 4%
if the compensation scheme is changed to the repayment amount-based plan. Figure A1 visually represents
the change in share of bad loans; repayment probability; and profit of each segment, which shows that if
the two tasks are not separated in terms of performance metrics, a salesperson in the hunter segment is less
likely to acquire bad loans by 8% (see Figure A1a), because of no incentive on the volume of acquisition,
collect more loans by 13% (see Figure A1b) because of fewer bad loans and more effort in loan collection;
and generate higher profits in the end (see Figure A1c). There is little difference in farmers’ performance
between plans, which shows that farmers’ incentive is already aligned well with the firm’s incentive under
the current compensation plan.
The implementation of the compensation plan based on loan repayment amount is, however, not straight-
forward in the actual setting due to the random transfer policy. Acquiring a new loan is not immediately
incentivized at the time of loan origination, but is rewarded only when the loan is repaid later on. The gap in
the timing of performance and reward is problematic in this setting because a salesperson can be transferred
right after loan acquisition, and before loan maintenance. Hence, the bank needs to jointly optimize the
transfer policy together with the incentive plan, which is beyond the scope of the current paper.
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Table A4 Profitability: Current versus Repayment Amount-based Metrics
Incentive Design Current metrics Repayment amount-based metric
(Bonus=A×M) (Bonus=RepayAmt/(4 ∗Quota))
Hunter Farmer Aggregate Hunter Farmer Aggregate
Acquisition - Good 93.1 98.3 94.8 93.8 94.3 94.0
Acquisition - Bad 196.8 102.9 166.8 139.9 93.6 125.1
Maintenance - Good 79.5 81.6 80.2 80.2 81.0 80.5
Maintenance - Bad 115.4 78.8 103.7 107.3 75.8 97.2
Net Present Value (NPV) 470.6 424.7 455.9 497.9 423.9 474.2
Incentive Payout 63.8 66.0 63.8 62.5 65.4 63.4
Profit (NPV - Payout) 406.8 358.7 392.1 435.5 358.5 410.8
1) Aggregate measures take account of share of hunters (68%) and that of farmers (32%) in the setting.
2) All values are in 1,000 pesos.
3) NPV is based on monthly interest rate of 1%.




























(c) Profit (1000 Pesos)
